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A. Introduction1 
“Man is the only creature that refuses to be
what he is.”—Albert Camus (1951, p.11)
In practice, this means that we improve our
minds through education, disciplined thinking,
and meditation; we improve our bodies with a
sound diet and physical exercise; and we train
with weapons and techniques to defend our-
selves from those who would conspire to kill.
But today, something seems to be different.
With ongoing work to unravel the mysteries
of our minds and bodies, coupled with the art
and science of emerging technologies, we are
near the start of the Human Enhancement
Homo sapiens has been such a prolific spe-
cies, simply because we are very good at re-
Revolution.
lentlessly adapting to our environment. At
Now we are not limited to “natural” methods
the most basic level, we have won control
over fire and tools to forge a new world
to enhance ourselves or to merely wield tools
such as a hammer or binoculars or a calcula-
around us, we build shelter and weave clothes
to repel the brutal elements, and we raise
animals and crops for predictability in our
meals. With our intellect and resourceful-
ness, we are thereby better able to survive
this world.
However, it is not just the world around us
that we desire to change. Since the beginning
of history, we also have wanted to become
more than human, to become Homo superior.
From the godlike command of Gilgamesh, to
the lofty ambitions of Icarus, to the preterna-
tor. We are beginning to incorporate tech-
nology within our very bodies, which may
hold moral significance that we need to con-
sider. These technologies promise great ben-
efits for humanity—such as increased produc-
tivity and creativity, longer lives, more sereni-
ty, stronger bodies and minds, and more— 
though, as we will discuss later, there is a
question whether these things translate into
happier lives, which many see as the point of
it all (President’s ouncil on ioethics, 2003; 
Persaud, 2006).
tural strength of Beowulf, to the mythical
skills of Shaolin monks, and to various sha-
mans and shapeshifters throughout the
world’s cultural history, we have dreamt—and
still dream—of transforming ourselves to
overcome our all-too-human limitations.
1 An abridged version of this report appears in:
Patrick Lin and Fritz Allhoff, “Untangling the De-
bate. The Ethics of Human Enhancement”, Na­
noEthics: Ethics for Technologies that Converge
at the Nanoscale (2008) 2: 251-264.
As examples of emerging technologies in the
last year or so, a couple imaginative inven-
tions in particular, among many, are closing
the gap even more between science fiction
and the real world. Scientists have conceptu-
alized an electronic-packed contact lens that
may provide the wearer with telescopic and
night vision or act as an omnipresent digital
monitor to receive and relay information
(Parviz, et al., 2008). Another innovation is a 
touch display designed to be implanted just
under the skin that would activate special
tattoo ink on one’s arm to form images, such
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Copyright 2009 © Allhoff, Lin, Moor, and Weckert.  All trademarks, logos and images are the property of their respective owners.
  
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
   
 
      
       
    
    
       
  
      
       
       
     
    
    
      
      
 
 
    
        
    
     
           
     
     
       
      
       
      
   
      
      
         
    
   
    
    
    
   
 
                                                 
          
     
        
    
      
     
   
      
      
      
      
        
        
       
       
   
    
       
    
     
      
     
     
      
     
     
 
 
        
       
       
       
          
        
    
      
       
    
    
     
     
     
 
    
     
    
        
as telephone-number keys to punch or even a 
video to watch (Mielke, 2008). Together with
ever-shrinking computing devices, we appear
to be moving closer to cybernetic organisms
(or “cyborgs”), that is, where machines are
integrated with our bodies or at least with our
clothing in the nearer-term. Forget about
Pocket PCs, mobile phones, GPS devices, and
other portable gadgets; we might soon be
able to communicate and access those capa-
bilities without having to carry any external
device, thus raising our productivity, efficien-
cy, response time, and other desirable meas-
ures—in short, enabling us to even better
survive our world.
Technology is clearly a game-changing field.
The invention of such things as the printing
press, gunpowder, automobiles, computers,
vaccines, and so on, has profoundly changed
the world, for the better we hope. But at the
same time, they have also led to unforeseen
consequences, or perhaps consequences that
might have been foreseen and addressed had
we bothered to investigate them. Least of all,
they have disrupted the status quo, which is
not necessarily a terrible thing in and of itself;
but unnecessary and dramatic disruptions, 
such as mass displacements of workers or
industries, have real human costs to them.  As
we will discuss, this may well be the case with
human enhancement technologies, enabled
by advances in nanotechnology, micro-
electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), genetic
engineering, robotics, cognitive science, in-
formation technology, pharmacology, and
other fields (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003).2 
2 For an overview of ethical and social issues of
nanotechnology beyond its role in human en-
hancement, see Lin and Allhoff, 2007; Lin, 2008;
Allhoff et al., forthcoming.
▌ 6
In this special report, we examine many ethi-
cal and social issues surrounding human en-
hancement technologies. For instance, on the
issue of whether such technologies ought to
be regulated or otherwise restricted, one po-
sition is that (more than minimal) regulation
would hinder personal freedom or autonomy,
infringing on some natural or political right to
improve our own bodies, minds, and lives as
we see fit (Naam, 2005; Bailey, 2005; Harris,
2007; Allhoff et al., forthcoming). Others,
however, advocate strong regulation—and
even a research moratorium—to protect
against unintended effects on society, such as
the presumably-undesirable creation of a new
class of enhanced persons who could outwit,
outplay, and outlast “normal” or unenhanced
persons for jobs, in schools, at sporting con-
tests, and so on, among other reasons (Fu-
kuyama, 2003, 2006; Friends of the Earth,
2006). Still others seek a sensible middle path
between stringent regulation and individual
liberty (Hughes, 2004; Greely, 2005).
No matter where one is aligned on this issue,
it is clear that the human enhancement de-
bate is a deeply passionate and personal one,
striking at the heart of what it means to be
human. Some see it as a way to fulfill or even
transcend our potential; others see it as a
darker path towards becoming Frankenstein’s
monster. To help untangle this debate, we 
have organized this report as the following list
of questions and answers, starting with back-
ground issues and moving to specific con-
cerns, including: freedom & autonomy, health
& safety, fairness & equity, societal disrup-
tion, and human dignity.
Each question-and-answer pair is largely self-
contained, allowing the reader to skip to
those issues of interest without affecting con-
tinuity much. In doing so, we are mindful of
E t h i c s o f H u m a n E n h a n c e m e n t : 2 5 Q u e s t i o n s & A n s w e r s 
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our audience, which we take to be primarily 
the broader public who is not as familiar with
the human enhancement debate but inter-
ested in engaging it. At the same time, we
offer original analysis that academics and
other experts in the field may find useful.
These discussions are not exhaustive; indeed,
many of these questions would require a
book-length treatise for any satisfying answer.
Rather, we intend for this report to broadly
survey the human enhancement landscape
and its main contours, not its more intricate
rabbit holes and subtler terrain, as other and
future investigations will explore.
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B. Definition & Distinctions
 
1. What is human enhancement?
To begin with, we need to draw several im-
portant distinctions.3 Strictly speaking, “hu-
man enhancement” includes any activity by
which we improve our bodies, minds, or abili-
ties—things we do to enhance our well-being.
So reading a book, eating vegetables, doing
homework, and exercising may count as en-
hancing ourselves, though we do not mean
the term this way in our discussion here.
These so-called “natural” human enhance-
ments are morally uninteresting because they
appear to be unproblematic to the extent that
it is difficult to see why we should not be
permitted to improve ourselves through diet,
education, physical training, and so on; yet it
is still an open question whether emerging,
engineered enhancements might or ought to
be unproblematic as well.
Rather, allow us to stipulate for the moment
that “human enhancement” is about boosting
our capabilities beyond the species-typical
level or statistically-normal range of function-
ing for an individual (Norm Daniels, 2000).
Relatedly, “human enhancement” can be un-
derstood to be different from “therapy”, 
which is about treatments aimed at patholo-
gies that compromise health or reduce one’s
3 We recognize that some advocates of human
enhancement argue against making such a dis-
tinction, especially between therapy and en-
hancement (e.g., Bostrom and Roache, 2008),
which seems to more easily justify unrestricted
human enhancement. Even if this position is
tenable, we do not want to take that point for
granted here, which we will discuss in question
4 below.
▌ 8
level of functioning below this species-typical
or statistically-normal level (Eric Juengst, 
1997). Another way to think about human
enhancement technologies, as opposed to
therapy, is that they change the structure and
function of the body (Greely, 2005). Admit-
tedly, none of these definitions is immune to
objections, but they are nevertheless useful
as a starting point in thinking about the dis-
tinction, including whether there really is such
a distinction.
Thus, corrective eyeglasses, for instance,
would be considered therapy rather than en-
hancement, since they serve to bring your
vision back to normal; but strapping on a pair
of night-vision binoculars would count as hu-
man enhancement, because they give you
sight beyond the range of any unassisted hu-
man vision. As another example, using stero-
ids to help muscular dystrophy patients regain
lost strength is a case of therapy; but steroid
use by otherwise-healthy athletes would give
them new strength beyond what humans typ-
ically have (thereby enabling them to set new
performance records in sports). And growing
or implanting webbing between one’s fingers
and toes to enable better swimming changes
the structure and function of those body
parts, counting then as a case of human en-
hancement and not therapy.
Likewise, as it concerns the mind, taking Rita-
lin to treat attention-deficit hyperactivity dis-
order (ADHD) is aimed at correcting the defi-
cit; but taken by otherwise-normal students
to enable them to focus better in studying for
exams is a form of human enhancement. And
where reading a book may indeed make you
more knowledgeable, it does not make you so
much smarter than most everyone else or
push your intellect past natural limits; on the
other hand, a computer chip implanted into
E t h i c s o f H u m a n E n h a n c e m e n t : 2 5 Q u e s t i o n s & A n s w e r s 
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▌ 9
your brain that gives you direct access to difficult to write or have taken years of re-
Google or spreadsheets would provide mental search then count as artificial enhancements?
capabilities beyond the species-typical level. What about reading a simple e-book on Ama-
zon’s Kindle™, which is a clearly a complex
and engineered device?
2. Is the natural-artificial distinction
morally significant in this debate? Further, the natural-artificial distinction often
rests on theological or teleological premises,
As we mentioned, strictly speaking, human i.e., that we have God-given goals or limits in
enhancements seem to include such activities life such that being able to lift 500 pounds
as reading a book, eating vegetables, doing over one’s head or living to age 300 is pro-
homework, and exercising. To the extent that fanely unnatural and in violation of nature or
these “natural” enhancements are ethically God’s will/ We do not wish to be mired in
unproblematic, it would be tempting to draw such theological issues, as important as they
a line here in the human enhancement de- are to theists, though we return briefly to
bate such that “artificial” or “unnatural” en- them in question 16.
hancements require moral evaluation.
However, the natural-versus-artificial distinc- 3. Is the internal-external distinction 
tion, as a way to identify human enhance- morally significant in this debate?
ments, may prove most difficult to defend
given the vagueness of the term “natural/” The previous examples suggest a further dis-
For instance, if we can consider X to be natu- tinction we should make. By “human en-
ral if X exists without any human intervention hancement” we do not mean the mere use of
or can be performed without human- tools, as this would render the concept impo-
engineered artifacts, then eating food (that is tent, turning nearly everything we do into
merely found but perhaps not farmed) and cases of human enhancement. But if and
exercising (e.g., running barefoot but not lift- when these tools are integrated into our bo-
ing dumbbells) would still be considered natu- dies, rather than employed externally, then
ral, but reading a book no longer qualifies as a we will consider them to be instances of hu-
natural activity (enhancement or not), since man enhancement (by stipulation again, for
books do not exist without humans. the moment). Of course, this raises the ques-
tion: What is so special about incorporating
Or if we allow that some human-dependent tools as part of our bodies, as opposed to
things can be natural, e.g., a flint axe or book, merely using them externally to the body (Bo-
depending on their level of complexity or the strom and Roache, 2008)? That is, why
amount of engineering required, this seems should the former count as human enhance-
to specify an arbitrary requirement which too ment, but not the latter? A neural implant
may be difficult (but not impossible?) to de- that gives access to Google and the rest of the
fend. If we want to say that reading books is online world does not seem to be different in
generally a form of natural enhancement (be- kind to using a laptop computer or Pocket PC
cause books are not as complex to create as, to access the same, so why should it matter
say, a computer), would some books that are that we are imbedding computing power into
E t h i c s o f H u m a n E n h a n c e m e n t : 2 5 Q u e s t i o n s & A n s w e r s 
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▌ 10
our heads rather than carrying the same ca- permanent by embedding or integrating it
pabilities with us by way of external devices? into our bodies is considered human en-
hancement, then it is not clear whether such
We will not attempt to give a full discussion of clothing ought to count as enhancement as
that point here, though it will be important to well. On one hand, clothes can be cast aside
explore the issue further, except to suggest like an !pple iPhone™, for instance, and (or
that integrating tools into our bodies (and because) they are external to us; yet we are
perhaps with our everyday clothing to the almost never without clothes, which may not
extent that we are rarely without our clothes) be so easy to shed once they are on. So while
appears to give us unprecedented advantages smart clothes may not be as permanent as,
which may be morally significant. These ad- say, a computer chip implanted in one’s
vantages include having easier, immediate, brains, they may approximate the always-on
and “always-on” access to those new capabili- or 24/7 access characteristic that, we stipu-
ties as if they were a natural part of our being; late, tracks the enhancement-versus-mere
we would never be without those devices, as tools distinction. Eyeglasses, too, that are not
we might forget to bring a laptop computer cumbersome to wear all day (e.g., in contrast
with us to a meeting. And assimilating tools to bulky, night-vision goggles today) and that
into our persons creates an intimate or en- give us super-vision or double as a computer
hanced connection with our tools that evolves display might plausibly be called an enhance-
our notion of personal identity, more so than ment. Therefore, we do not recognize the
simply owning things (as wearing name-brand central distinction in this debate as between
clothes might boost one’s sense of self). This internal or implanted tools and tools external
may translate into a substantial advantage for to our bodies, which is a distinction that
the enhanced person, more so than gained by seems to carry less prima facie moral relev-
purchasing an office computer or reading ance and would need greater argument to
books or training with the best coaches. establish.
Therefore, we might reasonably understand This is not to say that an enhancement-
the distinction between human enhancement versus-tools distinction is ultimately defensi-
and mere tools by looking for an always-on ble or not, but only that it does not help an
(i.e., on-demand or permanent) feature, as early investigation into the ethics of using
opposed to the temporary or contingent such technological innovations—whatever we
access of our daily gadgets and tools (e.g., a want to call them—to consider “enhance-
mobile phone can be easily lost, stolen, or left ment” so broadly that it obscures our intuitive
behind). But even so, this attempt at a defini- understanding of the concept and makes eve-
tion still needs further defense, as there are rything that gives us an advantage in life into
grey areas that need to be resolved. an enhancement.
For instance, one grey area is that of “smart If our considered distinction here cannot ul-
clothes”—clothing with devices embedded timately be defended—that is, if there is no
into them, or clothing made from new, dy- moral significance in using an enhancing de-
namic materials that may also serve as armor vice internally or externally to our bodies— 
or for medical purposes. If making a device then the implication is that all tools, from
E t h i c s o f H u m a n E n h a n c e m e n t : 2 5 Q u e s t i o n s & A n s w e r s 
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hammers to hardhats and from cars to com-
puters, ought to be recognized as forms of
human enhancement/ !nd there’s a prima
facie case to be made that, if hammers and
computers can be used without moral risk,
then more fantastical tools, e.g., neural im-
plants or gene therapy to halt aging or give
superhuman strength, should also be morally
permissible. However, this is not the end of
the debate, since we might agree that human
enhancement technologies per se are not mo-
rally problematic, but their use in certain ap-
plications or areas of life could still be ques-
tionable.
4.	 Is the therapy-enhancement distinction 
morally significant in this debate?
Returning to an issue previously raised in
question 1—and as a perhaps more critical
distinction to elucidate—some scholars have
reasonably objected that there is no real dis-
tinction between therapy and enhancement, 
which would mean that our working defini-
tion is inadequate. For instance, how should
we think about vaccinations: are they a form
of therapy, or are they an enhancement of 
our immune system (Daniels, 2000; Harris,
2007; Bostrom and Roache, 2008)? On one
hand, a vaccination seems to be an enhance-
ment in that there is no existing pathology it
is attempting to cure, merely a possible or
likely pathology we wish to avoid; but we are
drawn to declare it as some form of therapy— 
perhaps preventative therapy—given its close
association with medicine? And if enhance-
ments in general are ultimately found to be
socially or ethically problematic, then count-
ing vaccinations as enhancement opens the
possibility that it should be regulated or re-
stricted, which would create a serious public
health disaster as well as a counter-example
▌ 11
to the claim that enhancements are proble-
matic. Thus, even critics of human enhance-
ment may be loathe to put vaccinations in the
enhancement bucket, though there does not
seem to be an obviously superior reason to
think otherwise.
Another dilemma: If a genius were to sustain
a head injury, thereby reducing her IQ to
merely the “average” or “species-normal”
range, would raising her intelligence back to
its initial “genius” level count as therapy or
enhancement (Bostrom and Roache, 2008)?
Either one would seem plausible, but is there
a non-arbitrary reason for answering the
question either way? If an enhancement,
then how do we explain the difference be-
tween that and a clear (or clearer) case of
therapy in which we return an “average” per-
son who sustains a head injury back to the
“normal” IQ range?
The therapy-enhancement distinction holds
real stakes, beyond athletic and academic
competition. Recent news reports show that
the US military is increasingly prescribing anti-
depressants to soldiers in combat to alleviate
post-traumatic stress as well as stimulants to
counteract sleep deprivation—actions which
could be viewed as either creating a more
effective, level-headed soldier or returning
the soldier to the initial “normal” state of
combat readiness, further blurring the distinc-
tion (M. Thompson, 2008; Saletan, 2008).4 
4 However, if the military were to prescribe such
medications prior to combat, then one could
make the case for counting that as an enhance-
ment; but this may take us full circle back to the 
vaccination question, particularly as soldiers are
routinely vaccinated against bio-threats such as
anthrax.
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▌ 12
The above cases notwithstanding, we would collision between our intuitions and our ac-
agree that there are difficulties in precisely tions. For instance, critics may believe that
defining “human enhancement” (as there is human enhancement technologies give an
with making clear definitions of nearly any unfair advantage to some persons, fracturing
other concept), but maintaining the en- local or global societies (even more) between
hancement-therapy distinction, at least until the haves and have-nots (Fukuyama 2002,
it can be more fully explored, is nonetheless 2006; President’s ouncil on ioethics, 2003-
important for several reasons: Selgelid, 2007). Yet, at the same time, they
seem to endorse—to the extent that they
First, to the extent that pro-enhancement have not raised objections to—our use of ex-
advocates are primarily the ones arguing isting technologies (e.g., mobile phones,
against the therapy-enhancement distinction, computers, Internet) that also seem to coun-
if a goal is to engage the anti-enhancement tenance the same division to which human
camp, then it would make for a far stronger enhancement technologies are said to lead
case to meet those critics on their own us.
ground (i.e., to grant the assumption that
such a distinction exists). If it proves overly As another example, advocates of human en-
charitable to grant this assumption such that hancement may believe that individual au-
the pro-enhancement position is too difficult tonomy should trump health and safety con-
to defend without it, then perhaps more at- cerns, e.g., athletes should be permitted to
tention needs to be paid in arguing against take steroids or adults should be allowed to
the distinction in the first place, given that the take mood-enhancing drugs at will (Naam,
debate may hinge on this fundamental issue. 2005; Savulescu and Foddy, 2007). Yet, at the
same time, they do not offer objections to
Second, by not making these distinctions, keeping some drugs illegal, such as crystal
specifically between therapy and enhance- meth or crack cocaine, which becomes an
ment, it may be too easy to argue that all even more complicated dilemma if they advo-
forms of human enhancement are morally cate legalizing other contraband such as mari-
permissible given that the things we count as juana.
therapy are permissible. That is to say, we
risk making a straw man argument that does This is not to say that these tensions with our
not make a compelling case either for or intuitions are irresolvable, but only that
against any aspect of human enhancement. “common sense” is at stake for both sides of
Again, if the human enhancement debate the debate. And the initial intuition for the
turns on this distinction, then much more at- overwhelming majority of us is that there is a 
tention should be paid to defending or criticiz- therapy-enhancement distinction (since we
ing the distinction than has been to date. understand “therapy” and “enhancement” as
meaningfully discrete terms, even if some
Third, at least part of the reason that human cases do not neatly fit into either category).
enhancement is believed by both sides of the So it would be more interesting for pro-
debate to be the most important controversy enhancement advocates to reconcile their
in science and society this new century (Hurl- position with that intuition, if possible, rather
but, 2006) seems to be that it represents a than to reject the distinction, which is less
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satisfying. Or if the therapy-enhancement
distinction really is untenable, then more vi-
gorous argument seems to be needed before
we are prepared to cast aside our intuition.
Fourth, the famous philosophical puzzle “The
Paradox of the Heap” should be recalled here.
Given a heap of sand with N number of grains
of sand, if we remove one grain of sand, we
are still left with a heap of sand (that now
only has N-1 grains of sand). If we remove
one more grain, we are again left with a heap
of sand (that now has N-2 grains). If we ex-
tend this line of reasoning and continue to
remove grains of sand, we see that there is no
clear point P where we can definitely say that
a heap of sand exists on one side of P, but less
than a heap exists on the other side. In other
words, there is no clear distinction between a
heap of sand and a less-than-a-heap or even
no sand at all. However, the wrong conclu-
sion to draw here is that there is no difference
between them or that the distinction be-
tween a heap and no-heap should be dis-
carded (or between being bald and having
hair, as a variation of the paradox goes).
Likewise, it would seem fallacious to conclude
that there is no difference between therapy
and enhancement or that we should dispense
with the distinction. It may still be the case
that there is no moral difference between the
two, but we cannot arrive at it through the
argument that there is no clear defining line
or that there are some cases (such as vaccina-
tions, etc.) that make the line fuzzy. As with
“heap”, the terms “therapy” and “enhance-
ment” may simply be vaguely constructed and
require more precision to clarify the distinc-
tion.
Therefore, at least for the time being and for
the purposes of this report, we will assume
that a therapy-enhancement distinction is
▌ 13
defensible and illuminative, at least where it
aligns with our intuitions. Even if it is not,
again, this does not mean the end of the hu-
man enhancement debate: it could still be
that some enhancements (and therapies) are
morally problematic in certain applications or
areas of life, i.e., contexts may matter.
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▌ 14
them to be unproblematic, especially at a
start of debate exactly about those questions.
C. Contexts & Scenarios
For a similar reason, it does not really help to
dismantle or obviate the therapy-
5. Why would contexts matter in the ethics enhancement distinction by claiming that
of human enhancement? “everything good is an enhancement” as we
first considered in question 1—that educa-
We allow that it may ultimately be the case tion, diet, exercise, etc. are all enhancements,
that the therapy-enhancement distinction and because these instances are unobjection-
may be shallow and/or that enhancements able, then no enhancement is intrinsically
per se are not morally relevant; but we leave problematic. Besides being a loose generali-
those as open questions to be explored in this zation, we could make an argument that even
embryonic stage of the debate. It is possible, education, diet, etc. do have ethical implica-
and perhaps likely, that human enhancements tions (in that they may create inequities
need to be considered separately according to among individuals), but that these implica-
their type or application in an ethics investiga- tions are outweighed by other considerations,
tion. So, for instance, even if we do not con- such as liberty, the value of self-improvement,
sider vaccines as preventative therapy (which and so on; and that is why education, diet,
may be the more natural way to see it) but etc. are unobjectionable, all things consi-
view them as enhancements of our immune dered.
system, that does not imply that all enhance-
ments are morally unproblematic. Or we can make an argument that strict
equality is not morally required in the first
What counts as an enhancement and whether place, given the natural and manageable
it is morally relevant seems to be context- range of variations in our species; but if some
dependent. For example, we can imagine a future vaccine takes us well beyond this
society in which strict equality is the all- “normal” range, e.g., super-longevity or su-
important value, trumping individual rights to per-strength, our social systems (including law
life, liberty, knowledge, and so on; thus im- and public policy) are not equipped to ac-
munizing a person from a serious disease count for those extra abilities, thereby raising
might be prohibited in such a world, so to not latent issues of equity, fairness, access, etc.
upset egalitarian values or disrupt social insti- back to the forefront. Similarly, we can im-
tutions that strongly rely on a certain range of agine a world in which cognitive enhance-
life expectancy, e.g., a social security system. ments no longer hold much controversy as
Another example: freely burning fossil fuels they do today, after social structures in the
was less morally significant in 1910 than it is future have adapted to account for them— 
in 2010, given our current awareness of global just like, e.g., steroid use in sports might no
warming, pollution, and their causes and ef- longer be an ethical issue (perhaps only a
fects. Therefore, context matters, and so it health issue) if we create separate competi-
seems premature to say that all enhancement tions for the enhanced as well as unenhanced.
are morally worrisome, irrespective of con- Again, context seems to matter.
text; but it is also premature to declare all of
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6.	 What are some examples of enhance-
ment for cognitive performance?
In the area of improving mental performance,
individuals are already using pharmaceuticals
available today to achieve such goals as in-
creased productivity, creativity, serenity, and
happiness. We previously mentioned Ritalin
use, intended for ADHD patients, by other-
wise-normal students to boost concentration
as a way to study more effectively. In sports,
drugs such as beta-blockers, intended to treat
high blood pressure and other disorders by
slowing down the heart rate, have been used
to reduce anxiety as a way to boost physical
performance, such as in preparing for an im-
portant and nerve-racking putt in golf or
steadying an archer’s hand to better release
the arrow in between heartbeats. In warfare,
anti-depressants and stimulants have been
used to treat post-traumatic stress and sleep
deprivation, thereby creating better, more
effective soldiers. And, of course, hallucino-
genic and other recreational drugs, including
alcohol, continue to be used (and used fa-
mously by some authors and artists) to
achieve greater creativity, relaxation, and
even enlightenment.
In the future, as technology becomes more
integrated with our bodies, we can expect
neural implants of the kind we mentioned
above that effectively puts computer chips
into our brains or allows devices to be
plugged directly into our heads, giving us al-
ways-on access to information as well as un-
precedented information-processing powers.
New and future virtual reality programs are
able to much better simulate activities, for
instance, to train law enforcement officers
and soldiers in dangerous situations so that
▌ 15
they can respond better to similar events in
the real world.
7. 	 What are some examples of enhance-
ment for physical performance?
In the area of physical performance, steroids
use by athletes is one of the most obvious
examples.  Cosmetic surgery has also grown in
popularity, not for corrective purposes but to
increase (perceived) attractiveness, and this
has ethical and genetic implications (Scott,
2009). Prosthetic limbs have improved to
such a degree that they are already enabling
greater than normal strength and capabilities
to those that use them, sparking a debate on
whether athletes with those artificial limbs
may participate in the Olympics (Edwards,
2008a).
In the future, we can expect continuing ad-
vances in robotics and bionanotechnology to
give us cybernetic body parts, from bionic
arms to artificial noses and ears, that surpass
the capabilities of our natural body. Today,
research organizations such as MIT’s Institute
for Soldier Nanotechnologies are working on
an exoskeleton to give the wearer superhu-
man strength as well as flexible battlesuits
that can, for instance, harden when needed
to create a splint or tourniquet to attend to
injuries more quickly and effectively (MIT,
2008). And we previously mentioned innova-
tive designs such as for contact lenses that
enable us to see in the dark or receive infor-
mation from a miniature digital monitor. Fur-
ther, designs have already been drawn for
even more fantastic innovations such as a 
respirocyte: an artificial red blood cell that
holds a reservoir of oxygen (Freitas, 1998). A
respirocyte would come in handy for, say, a
heart attack victim to continue breathing for
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▌ 16
an extra hour until medical treatment is avail- head; all of these procedures have been done
able, despite a lack of blood circulation to the already. In the future, we can envision the
lungs or anywhere else. But in an otherwise- possibility that prosthetic flippers, designed
healthy athlete, a respirocyte could boost per- today for dolphins, along with artificial gills,
formance by delivering extra oxygen to the etc., might be requested by humans who 
muscles, as if the person were breathing from want to transform into an aquatic animal.
a pure oxygen tank. This type of enhancement, of course, brings
to the forefront the question whether “en-
And perhaps as an example of both mental hancement” is the right word to use in the
and physical enhancement, we should also debate in the first place, as opposed to simply
consider life extension, whether it comes by “human engineering” or a more neutral term
curing fatal pathologies (such as cancer) or that does not imply improvement. Indeed,
rejuvenating the body/mind or developing even in cases where technology boosts men-
anti-aging medicine, and whether it enables tal and physical capabilities, it seems that we
us to live another 20 or 100 or 1,000 years cannot predict with any accuracy whether
(radical life extension). This is a particularly there will be any negative psychological or
contentious issue in the human engineering physiological side-effects that will offset the
debate, not just for obvious concerns related intended benefits of a particular enhance-
to the burden of overpopulation on quality of ment. For instance, in drinking alcohol as a
life or loss of meaning in life, but also because mood-enhancer of sorts, we already know
it seems that we are already—and presuma- that it can hold the unintended effect of a
bly unproblematically—extending our lives painful hangover, and steroids taken by ath-
through better nutrition, medicine, exercise, letes can have disastrous health conse-
sanitation, and so forth; yet there is some- quences; in such cases, we cannot easily say
thing troubling to many about the prospect of the benefits outweigh the harms.
radical life extension, even if we can all agree
that, in principle, more life is better than less Moreover, if human enhancement can be ul-
life. We will return to this in question 13 be- timately defended, then un-enhancements
low. may seem to be morally permissible as well, if
individual autonomy is the most important
value to consider in the debate (P. Thompson,
8. Should a non-therapeutic procedure that 2008). There are already medical cases in
provides no net benefit be called an “en- which: individuals want to amputate some
hancement”? healthy limb from their bodies (Dyer, 2000); 
parents want to stunt the growth of their be-
Some applications of technology or modifica- dridden child to keep her portable and easier
tions of our bodies may seem gratuitous, such to care for (Edwards, 2008b); and deaf par-
as attempting to physically transform into a ents who specifically want a deaf baby in se-
lizard by tattooing scales all over one’s body lecting embryos for in vitro fertilization (Den-
and forking one’s tongue, or into a cat by im- nis, 2004). Un-enhancements aside, we will
planting whiskers, sharpening teeth and clip- continue to use “enhancement” in this report
ping one’s ears, or into something other than for the most part, since there is a presump-
human with implanted horns in one’s fore- tion that whatever technology is integrated
E t h i c s o f H u m a n E n h a n c e m e n t : 2 5 Q u e s t i o n s & A n s w e r s 
Copyright 2009 © Allhoff, Lin, Moor, and Weckert.  All trademarks, logos and images are the property of their respective owners.
  
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
   
 
       
      
        
    
      
     
  
▌ 17
 
with our bodies will be expected to deliver
some net benefit, real or perceived (other-
wise, why do it?). Further, we will limit our
discussion here primarily to those technolo-
gies that enhance human cognitive and physi-
cal abilities, rather than seemingly-gratuitous
procedures or un-enhancements.
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D. Freedom & Autonomy
 
9.	 Could we justify human enhancement
technologies by appealing to our right to 
be free?
There is perhaps no greater value, at least in
democracies, than the cherished concept of
freedom, loosely defined here as the absence
of constraints. But because freedom is cen-
tral to the issue of human enhancement, it
adds much fuel to the impassioned debate.
Pro-enhancement advocates have argued
against regulating enhancements on the
grounds that it would infringe on our funda-
mental ability to choose how we want to live
our own lives (Naam, 2005; Bailey, 2005; Har-
ris, 2007). Or, in other words, if enhancing
our bodies does not hurt anyone (other than
possibly ourselves; more on this in question
10), then why should we be prevented from
doing so? This is a common objection— 
arguing especially against governmental in-
tervention—to any number of proposals that
involve regulation, from hiring practices to
home improvements to school clothing and so
on.
Though freedom may be viewed in democra-
cies as a “sacred cow” that ought not be cor-
ralled, the reality is that we do not have com-
plete freedom in the areas of life that we
think we do anyway. As examples, freedom
of the press and freedom of speech do not
protect the individual from charges of libel,
slander, or inciting panic by yelling “Fire!” in a
crowded theater; our privacy expectations
quietly give way to security measures, such as
searches on our property and persons at air-
ports or eavesdropping on our communica-
▌ 18
tions; and even ancestral homes built by the
hands of one’s forefathers could be unilateral-
ly seized (and demolished) by the state under
eminent domain laws. This is to say that
whatever rights we have also imply responsi-
bilities and exist within some particular politi-
cal system, therefore it is not unreasonable to
expect or define certain limits for those rights, 
especially where they conflict with other
rights and obligations.
Maximal freedom is a hallmark of a laissez-
faire or minimal state, but a democratic socie-
ty is not compelled to endorse such a stance, 
as some political philosophers have suggested
(e.g., Nozick, 1974). Nor would reasonable
people necessarily want unrestricted freedom
anyway, e.g., no restrictions or background
checks for gun ownership. Even the most lib-
eral democracy today understands the value
of regulations as a way to enhance our free-
dom. For instance, our economic system is
not truly a “free market”: though we may ad-
vocate freedom in general, regulations exist
not only to protect our rights, but also to
create an orderly process that greases the
economic wheel, accelerating both innova-
tions and transactions. As a simpler example,
by imposing laws on traffic, we can actually 
increase our freedom: by driving forward on
only one side of the road, for instance, we can
be (more) assured that we will not be a victim
of a head-on collision, which makes driving
faster a more sensible proposition.
There is another sense, related to free will, in
which cognitive enhancements may be in-
fringing: if an enhancement, such as a mood-
altering drug or neural implant, interferes or
alters our deliberative process, then it is an
open question whether or not we are truly
acting freely while under the influence of the
enhancement. For instance, a “citizen chip”
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embedded in the brain might cause us to be
unswervingly patriotic and hold different val-
ues than we would otherwise have. Further,
external pressure from peers, employers,
competitors, national security, and others to
accept a particular enhancement also may
unduly influence one’s decision making. (Gus-
ton, Parsi, and Tosi, 2007.)
10. Could we justify enhancing humans if it
harms no one other than perhaps the in-
dividual?
To justify restrictions on our freedom and au-
tonomy, of course, we would need strong,
compelling reasons to offset that prima facie
harm; specifically, we need to identify con-
flicting values that ought to be factored into
our policymaking. One possible reason is that
human enhancement technologies may pose
a health risk to the person operated upon, 
similar to illegal or unprescribed steroids use
by athletes: given how precious little we still
know about how our brains and other biologi-
cal systems work, any tinkering with those
systems would likely give rise to unintended
effects, from mild to most serious (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003). Even drinking
pure water—perhaps the safest thing we can
do to our own bodies—may have some
harms. For example, maybe we become de-
pendent on fluoridated water to prevent
tooth decay or drink too much water which
dilutes sodium in the body to dangerously-low
or fatal levels. Or consider that many of the
foods we eat everyday are suspected to have
some causal connection to disease or un-
wanted conditions. It is therefore quite likely
that making radical changes to our bodies
undoubtedly will have surprising side-effects.
▌ 19
Is this reason enough to restrict human en-
hancement technologies, for the sake of pro-
tecting the would-be patient? The answer is 
not clear. Even if such technologies prove to
be so dangerous or risky that we strongly be-
lieve we need to protect individuals from
their own decisions to use those technologies
(through paternalistic regulations), the well-
informed individual might circumvent this
issue by freely and knowingly consenting to
those risks, thereby removing this reason to
restrict use.
But even this case does not solve the conflict
between autonomy and health/safety. First,
it is not always clear whether a person’s con-
sent is sufficiently informed or not. For in-
stance, consider a partygoer who may have
heard that smoking cigarettes can be addic-
tive and harmful but nonetheless begins to
smoke anyway; this seems to be a less-
informed decision than one made by a person
with a parent whose smoking caused a specif-
ic and horrible illness (and associated ex-
penses). Furthermore, the partygoer may be
unduly influenced by peers or movies that
glamorize smoking. So paternalistic regula-
tions could be justified under some circums-
tances; e.g., where risks are not adequately
communicated or understood, for children,
and so on.
Second, the assumption that a procedure to
implant some human enhancement technolo-
gy may affect the health and safety of only
that patient appears to be much too gener-
ous. Indeed, it is rare to find any human ac-
tivity that has absolutely no impact on other
persons, either directly or indirectly, such that
our own freedom or autonomy is the only
value at stake and clearly should be pro-
tected. For instance, opponents to regulating
such activities as gambling, recreational drugs
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(including smoking tobacco), prostitution,
segregation, and so forth commonly cite the
need to protect their freedom or rights as the
primary objection to those regulations. Yet,
this objection ignores the opposing argument,
which is that such activities may harm other
persons, either actually or statistically.
To look at just one of many examples, at first
glance, unfettered gambling seems to affect
only the gambler (it is his money to win or
lose, so the argument goes); but a broader
analysis would point out that many gamblers
have families whose bank accounts are being
risked and that desperate gamblers may
commit crimes to finance their addiction,
never mind harms to the out-of-control gamb-
ler himself. Even marijuana use, which in
many cases may be justified and allegedly
harms no one, might be traced back to dan-
gerous cartels that terrorize or bully the local
population. Furthermore, irresponsible use of
the drug could cause accidents or the user to
neglect his or her obligations, family, etc.
Notice here that we are not arguing that ac-
tivities such as gambling and recreational drug
use should be completely banned, but only
that some measure of oversight seems to be
appropriate for the sake of others, if not also
for the welfare of the individual.
Relating back to the human enhancement
debate, it seems premature to say that only
the would-be enhanced person assumes any
risk, even if the procedure does not affect his
or her germline (i.e., cannot be passed on to
the next generation). The harm or risk to
others could also be indirect: Where steroids
use by athletes sets the presumably-wrong
example for children whose bodies and minds
are still developing, we can anticipate a simi-
lar temptation to be created with human en-
hancement technologies among children.
▌ 20
Even parents may feel pressure—or even an
obligation—to enhance their children, which
arises from the natural desire to want the
best for our children or, in this case, make
them the best they can be (see question 21).
Third, even if the harm that arises from any
given instance of human enhancement is so
small as to be practically negligible, the indi-
vidual choices to enhance oneself can lead to
aggregate harms that are much larger and
substantial/ For instance, in today’s environ-
mental debate, calls are increasing to limit
activities from lawn care or drinking bottled
water: on one hand, the amount of extra wa-
ter needed to keep one’s lawn green seems
small, as is also the amount of fertilizer or
pesticide that might leach into the groundwa-
ter, but the cumulative effect of millions of 
homeowners caring for a pristine patch of
grass can be disastrous for a nation’s water
supply and health.
Likewise, as human enhancement technolo-
gies improve and are adopted by more
people, the once-negligible harms that arise
from individual cases may metastasize into
very real harms to large segments of society
(Parfit, 1986). Life extension, as one case,
may appear to be a great benefit for the indi-
vidual, but on an aggregate scale, it could put
pressure or burdens on families, retirement
programs, overpopulation, and so on; we will
return to this in question 13.
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E. Fairness & Equity
 
11. Does human enhancement raise issues of
fairness, access, and equity?
Even if we can understand why there would
be pressure to enhance one’s self or children,
it is important to note the following: advan-
tages gained by enhanced persons also imply
a relative disadvantage for the unenhanced,
whether in sports, employment opportunities,
academic performance, or any other area.
That is to say, fairness is another value to con-
sider in the debate. A related worry is that
the wealthy would be the first adopters of
human enhancement technologies, given that
they can best afford such innovations (like
LASIK eye surgery), thus creating an even
wider gap between the haves and the have-
nots (McKibben, 2004).
In considering the issue of fairness, we need
to be careful to not conflate it with equity.
Under most economic theories, fairness does
not require that we need to close the gap en-
tirely between economic classes, even when
justice is defined as fairness (Rawls, 1971; for
an application of Rawls to enhancement, see
Allhoff, 2005). Indeed, there are good rea-
sons to think that we want some gap to exist,
for example, to provide incentives for innova-
tions, in order to move up the economic lad-
der, and to allow flexibility in a workforce to
fill vacancies and perform a wide range of
tasks. At least some competition seems to be
desirable, especially when resources to be
allocated are limited or scarce and when
compared to the historically-unsuccessful al-
ternative of the state attempting to equalize
the welfare of its citizens.
▌ 21
Thus, inequality itself is not so much the
point, though any poverty or decline in wel-
fare related to increased inequality may be a
serious concern. We do not want people to
stop striving to improve their own lives, even
if the situation for others is not improved at
the same time or ever. And natural advan-
tages and inequities already exist without
moral issues anyway; Hobbes recognized that
these organic differences did not give any
individual or group of individuals so much net
advantage that they would be invulnerable to
the “nasty, brutish, and short” conditions that
mark human life (Hobbes, 1651).
Yet if human enhancement technologies de-
velop as predicted, they can afford us a tre-
mendous advantage in life; e.g., over others in
a competition for resources, so much so that
it overstretches the natural range of equality
to the point where inequality becomes a
more salient issue. This is where the gap be-
tween enhanced and unenhanced persons
may be too wide to bridge, making the latter
into dinosaurs in a hypercompetitive world. If
we assume that the benefits of being an en-
hanced person must be largely paid from the
welfare of others, e.g., a job-gain by one per-
son is a job-loss by another, since the others
are now at a relative disadvantage, this may
impoverish the unenhanced, which would
limit their access to such things as healthcare,
legal representation, political influence, and
so on.
Related to the notion of equity is that of fair-
ness.  Even if pronounced inequality is morally
permissible, there is still a question of how an
individual accesses or affords a human en-
hancement technology, which may be unfair
or unacceptably magnify the inequality. If the
distribution of or access to enhancement
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technologies is not obviously unfair, e.g., ille- divide”: those who did not have adequate
gally discriminatory, then perhaps we can jus- access to the technology were disadvantaged
tify the resulting inequities. But what would relative to those who did. While this divide
count as a fair distribution of those technolo- reflected, by and large, the existing divide
gies? A scheme based on need or productivi- between haves and have-nots, ICT exagge-
ty or any other single dimension would be rated that divide (Rooksby and Weckert,
easily defeated by the standard arguments 2004). Not long ago, the less-advantaged
that they overlook other relevant dimensions within developed societies could listen to the
(Rescher, 1980). Even if a market system is radio, go to the free public library, and read
considered to be fair or an acceptable approx- inexpensive newspapers. As information and
imation of it, many still object to the unfair- communication increasingly moved to the 
ness of our starting points, which may result Internet, their access to both information and
from bad luck or other arbitrary circums- communication decreased relative to that by
tances, or date back to monarchies, aristocra- the more-advantaged. It is feared by some
cies, “robber barons”—recall the saying that that nanotechnology will also sharpen and
behind every great fortune there is a great widen divisions both within societies and be-
crime (de Balzac, 1835). And even if the start- tween nations: a nanodivide will be created.
ing points were fair, the subsequent market Whether or not this happens depends partly
processes would need to be fair in order for on how nanotechnology develops. If its appli-
the results (e.g., that only the wealthy can cations are primarily in enhancing existing
afford human enhancement technologies, materials, cosmetics, electronics and medi-
who then gain significant advantages over the cine and if these are relatively inexpensive,
unenhanced) to be declared fair (Nozick, then there may be no increase in inequalities.
1974). However, if they are expensive and particular-
ly useful and desirable, then they probably
will.
12. Will it matter if there is an “enhance-
ment divide”? This in itself does not show that there is a
problem, of course. There is a problem only if
We have heard much about the “digital di- the created inequalities are unfair and there-
vide”, but one day there may well be a “nano fore morally wrong. Technologies have both
divide”: the gap between those who can benefits and costs and inequities can occur in
access and benefit from nanotechnology and both. Just as benefits can be distributed une-
those without. If there is also an “enhance- qually, so can the costs, but none of these
ment divide”, it could prove to be an even inequalities is necessarily wrong, it can be
greater disadvantage for those on the wrong argued. The argument that they do not mat-
side. They would not be as physically or men- ter morally can be derived from a number of
tally capable as others. What policies, if any, ethical theories, but it also depends on the
should be developed to either avoid or cope particular enhancements in question. En-
with this situation? hancements for a few that enable them to
better solve the world’s environmental prob-
The rise of information and communications lems would satisfy Rawls’ difference principle
technology (ICT) led to the so-called “digital in that the extra inequality in ability would
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help the worst off (Rawls, 1971). Enhance-
ments in sporting ability or other abilities that
benefit only the person enhanced would fall
foul of that principle and so perhaps should
not be allowed. They might however, be jus-
tified on utilitarian grounds, if they help in-
crease total happiness, or on the basis of
desert or some other way. So the question
“Will it matter if there is an enhancement
divide?”, like many of the questions we ex-
plore in this report, cannot be easily ans-
wered but will involve an examination of the
enhancements in question and of the underly-
ing ethical theories.
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F. Societal Disruptions
 
13. What kind of societal disruptions might
arise from human enhancement?
Fairness and equality are not just theoretical
values, but they have practical effects. Gross
inequality itself, whether fair or not, can mo-
tivate the worse-off masses to revolt against a
state or system. But societal disruption need
not be so extreme to be taken seriously. En-
tire institutions today—as well as the lack
thereof—are based on a specific range of abil-
ities and rough equality of natural assets.
Sports, for instance, would change dramati-
cally, if enhanced persons are permitted to
compete to the clear disadvantage to unen-
hanced athletes, smashing their previous
records. (This is not to say that sports should
ban enhanced competitors, only that doing so
would have a real, significant affect on ca-
reers and expend valuable resources to adjust
sporting programs and contests; and in the
end, it is not clear that sports is better off for
its trouble or that which it has caused.)
Other institutions and systems include eco-
nomic (jobs), privacy, communications,
pensions, security, and many other areas of
society. For instance, if life-extension tech-
nologies can increase our average lifespan by
20 years—let alone the 100+ years predicted
by some futurists (Kurzweil, 2005; de Grey,
2007), and assuming that the extra 20 years
will be a good life, not one bogged down with
illness and diminishing productivity that afflict
many elderly today—then we would need to
radically adjust retirement programs: do we
move the retirement age to 85, which has
negative consequences for job-seekers such
▌ 24
as new tenure-track academic faculty, or in-
crease contributions to pension plans, which
puts pressure on household budgets and em-
ployers? Or both? Also, assuming birth rates
do not decline (which causes problems of its
own), longer lives will mean more pressure on
resources such as energy and food, in addition
to jobs, so this could disrupt society in nega-
tive ways.
Looking more into the distance, if enhance-
ment technologies enable us to adapt our
bodies to, say, underwater living (with im-
plantable gills, flippers, echolocation, new 
skin, etc.), then we would need to construct
new institutions to govern that lifestyle, from
underwater real estate to pollution rules to
law enforcement to handling electronic de-
vices to currency (replacing paper money of
non-waterworlds). Or if this sounds too far-
fetched, consider humanity’s rush into outer
space that will require similar attention to be
paid to such issues in the near future (Lin,
2006).
Other nearer-term scenarios that may cause
social disruption include: a job candidate with
a neural implant that enables better data re-
tention and faster information processing
would consistently beat out unenhanced can-
didates; a person with super-human hearing
or sight could circumvent existing privacy pro-
tections and expectations by easily and unde-
tectably eavesdropping or spying on others;
more students (and professors) using Ritalin
may grab admission or tenure at all the best
universities, reducing those opportunities for
others; and so on.
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14. Are societal disruptions reason enough To be clear, there presumably will be benefits
to restrict human enhancement? to society from enhanced persons. We can
expect greater productivity or more creative
From the preceding answer, societal disrup- and intellectual breakthroughs, which is why
tion is clearly a non-trivial concern and seems individuals would want to be enhanced in the
to be something we want to mitigate where first place. But what remains difficult to cal-
we can, though this does not imply that we culate is whether these gains outweigh the
should resist change in general. Minimizing costs or risks, or even the likelihood of either
disruption might be achieve by transitioning gains or costs—which is needed if we do find
laid-off workers immediately to a new job or it sensible to use a precautionary principle to
job-training program, rather than allowing the guide our policymaking.
layoffs to come unexpectedly which leaves 
the newly-unemployed with few options but
to fend for themselves. Today, without this 15. If individuals are enhanced differently, 
kind of preparation, we trust that these social will communication be more difficult or
and economic disruptions eventually will be impossible?
handled, but there is still a real cost to those
affected by layoff that could have been better In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
mitigated. The typewriter industry, as an ex- (1953) said that if a lion could speak, we could
ample, was blindsided by the fast-growing not understand it; and in !lice’s !dventures in
word-processing industry in the 1980s, lead- Wonderland, Lewis Carroll (1865) demon-
ing to the displacement of thousands of strates some problems that Alice had com-
workers, both on the manufacturing and the municating with a caterpillar. Both examples
end-users’ sides. (Similar situation exist for highlight the importance of the body in com-
the spreadsheet industry that displaced munication. For Wittgenstein sharing a lan-
countless accountants and bookkeepers, the guage involves sharing a form of life, and lions
computer-aided design industry that dis- and humans are too different to share the
placed graphic artists, and so on.) latter so they cannot share the former either.
Language is social, and we communicate with
But, unless it will be clearly and seriously each other about experiences that we have
harmful, social disruption by itself does not reason to believe we can all understand, more
seem enough to count as a strong reason or less. This is a plausible belief given that we
against regulating enhancement technologies. are the same species, made of the same stuff,
After all, we do not wish that typewriters close to the same shape, and with the same
were never replaced with word-processing sense organs.
programs, though we hope the affected em-
ployees readily found gainful jobs elsewhere. But what if we were radically different from
Human enhancement technologies, likewise, each other? Suppose that some humans had
do not necessarily need to be halted or regu- the vision of an eagle or could see infrared. If
lated, but it seems more prudent and respon- some of us have enhanced vision or quite dif-
sible to anticipate and prepare for any disrup- ferent vision, how would this affect communi-
tive effects. cation and general social cohesion? Or con-
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sider a more radical situation in which some-
one is enhanced by the addition of a different
sense; for example, the echolocation capabili-
ties of a bat. Suppose too that it became
possible to have enhancements of numerous
kinds and that we could choose which we
wanted, if any. Could a conservative, unen-
hanced human, communicate easily with
highly-enhanced neighbors who had all kinds
of experiences of which he could not con-
ceive? Probably not. And communication
may be even more difficult between people
who have quite different enhancements.
The answer to the question is that almost cer-
tainly communication would become more
difficult. Just how difficult is partly an empiri-
cal matter, of course. Sighted people can
communicate with the sight-impaired. But
given what we know about the social nature
of language and the importance of shared
experiences in communication, it is difficult to
see how problems could be avoided. None of
this may matter of course. We, as we cur-
rently are, are social creatures, but our en-
hanced heirs may not be, or not in the way 
that we are. They may not mind if there are
few with whom they can easily communicate.
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G. Human Dignity & The Good
Life
16.	 Does the notion of human dignity suffer
with human enhancements?
The fiercest resistance to human enhance-
ment technologies is perhaps a concern about
their effect on “human dignity” and what it
means to be human (President’s ouncil on
Bioethics, 2003; Sandel, 2007). For instance,
does the desire for enhancement show ingra-
titude for what we have and (further) enable
an attitude of unquenchable dissatisfaction
with one’s life? Some researchers suggest
that discontent is hardwired into the genetic
makeup of humans (Hill, 2006; Woodall,
2007), which is why we constantly innovate,
strive to achieve and gain more, etc. Howev-
er, even if this is true, it does not seem to be
so much an argument to promote human en-
hancement technologies, but more a worry
that those technologies are not the panacea
or Holy Grail of happiness we might believe
them to be; that is, we will still be dissatisfied
with ourselves no matter how much we en-
hance ourselves (unless, of course, we some-
how eradicate that part of our DNA that caus-
es discontent).
Would human enhancement technologies
hinder moral development? Many believe
that “soul-making” is impossible without
struggle (Hick, 1966), and achievements ring
hollow without sacrifice or effort (President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003); so if technology
makes life and competitions easier, then we
may lose opportunities to feed and grow our
moral character. On the other hand, compare
our lives today with pre-Internet days: in-
▌ 27
creased connectivity to friends, work, infor-
mation, etc. is often a double-edged proposi-
tion that also increases stress and decreases
free time. This, then, raises the related con-
cern of whether enhancement technologies
will actually make our lives happier. (If the
research mentioned above about discontent
in our genes is accurate, then we might have a
psychobiological reason to think not.)
Is the frailty of the human condition neces-
sary to best appreciate life? There is some-
thing romantic about the notion of being mor-
tal and fallible. But with existing pharmacolo-
gy, we could eliminate the emotion of sadness
today, and work is continuing on drugs that
repress memories; but it is not clear that sad-
ness (at least in the normal range, as opposed
to clinical depression) is a “pathology” we
should want to eliminate, rather than a hu-
man experience that we should preserve
(President’s ouncil on ioethics, 2003). Oth-
er critics have suggested that life could be too
long, leading to boredom after one’s life-goals
are achieved (e.g., Williams, 1973).
Finally, we will mention here the related, per-
sistent concern that we are playing God with
world-changing technologies, which is pre-
sumably bad (Peters, 2007). But what exactly
counts as “playing God”, and why is that mo-
rally wrong; i.e., where exactly is the proscrip-
tion in religious scripture? If we define the
concept as manipulating nature, then we all
have been guilty of that since the first man 
picked up a stick. Making life-and-death deci-
sions is a plausible candidate as a definition,
but then physicians as well as soldiers (even in
holy wars?) could be accused of this charge.
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In the future, with human enhancements,
17. Will we need to rethink the notion of a things will be less clear. Do we know if par-
“good life”? ticular “enhancements” will improve life?
Will enhanced people be happier, and if not,
Up until now, we have had a reasonably good why bother with enhancements? Can we say
idea of what makes life better, and we can be much about the “good life” for an “enhanced” 
fairly confident about what makes life better person? One important factor is this: Cur-
for most, and, although this is more contro- rently, people around the world are more or
versial, roughly what constitutes a good life. less the same. We know in general what sorts
For Aristotle, the one thing that everyone of things make people happy, what makes
wanted for its own sake was happiness, and them suffer, what gives pleasure and pain,
the best way of achieving this was through a and so on. If human enhancements become
life of contemplation, or study (Aristotle, 1941 widespread, it is likely that people will be-
trans.). Happiness (or eudaimonia) for Aris- come very different from each other. Many 
totle was a much richer concept than it cur- different kinds of enhancements, and en-
rently is for us. It involved living well and hancements to different levels may be possi-
doing well, it was something that lasted for a ble, and if people are free to choose, they will
sustained period (one could not be happy for choose differently. So it may not be known
just an hour), and it could not apply to just what should be done to relieve the suffering
one aspect of life. In general, it meant overall or increase the pleasure of others. In an im-
success, prosperity, and achievement. It re- portant respect, our commonality will be lost,
sulted from virtue, but also required external and if this is so, the notion of “the good life”
goods, for example good birth, good children becomes vacuous in the sense of being even a
and beauty. vague guide for action.
James Moor argues that there are certain un- It is difficult to know whether enhancement
derlying core values that all people have would make life better overall. Consider di-
(Moor, 1999). These are: life, happiness rect communication between brains: How
(pleasure), and autonomy. In order to exer- would this affect our privacy? Currently, my
cise our autonomy we require the ability to thoughts are mine alone, more or less, some-
do various things, the security to do them, the thing for which I am very grateful. This is not
knowledge about doing them, the freedom so much because I intentionally think things
and opportunity to do them, and finally the that I should not, but more that I do not have
resources to accomplish our goals. In order to the same sort of control over my thoughts
achieve a good life we require all of these, but that I have over my actions. My autonomy
different people will not give all of the com- would be reduced to the extent that I would
ponents the same weightings, and therefore have much less control over what people
conceptions of the good life will be different knew about me, and this would certainly
for different people, but not radically so. Aris- make me more vulnerable to government and
totle and Moor both are talking about hu- employer control. Consider too enhanced
mans as they are now. senses: Suppose that I had the vision of an
eagle. I really cannot say that this would im-
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prove my life, because I have no idea what it
would be like.
Humans are basically social creatures who like
living in groups, and this aspect would appear
to be under threat in a diversely enhanced
world. Could one be a friend of a much more
enhanced person? Aristotle would probably
say not. Real friends must be equals. Could I
understand this person? Wittgenstein would
have his doubts. While both Aristotle and
Wittgenstein might both appear to overstate
the case, communication and friendship are
easier between people who are similar, and
radical enhancements raise the possibility of
very diverse groups of humans (or creatures
like humans) existing. Such considerations do
suggest that there would be a need to rethink
what constitutes a good life, or even an im-
proved life, for humans.
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the grounds that it infringes on the rights of
others or that its exercise would lead to ex-
H. Rights & Obligations treme harm.
The right to enhancement can also be re-
18. Is there a right to be enhanced? garded as conventional/ “onventional” does
not mean “arbitrary” but “established by gen-
Rights can be divided into two broad classes: eral agreement or practice/” We can make
a class of human rights, sometimes called laws, for example, that allow some enhance-
“natural rights”, and a class of more conven- ments and laws that prohibit others. How
tional rights based on the specific customs, justified such conventional rights or prohibi-
roles, and laws of a society. Examples of the tions are depends upon how good the reasons
former are famously listed in the American for them are. We might easily justify the use
Declaration of Independence: “We hold these of nanodevices that patrol our bodies for can-
truths to be self-evident, that all men are cerous outbreaks. We would prohibit the use
created equal, that they are endowed by their of nanodevices that would give humans a
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that burst of intelligence followed by likely sei-
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit zures and strokes.
of Happiness/” The right to enhancement is
not included in this list or in other familiar Discussion of rights remains controversial in
lists of human rights. But it could be argued philosophical circles. Some argue that the
that a right of enhancement is a right derived justification of human enhancement in partic-
from some or all of the human rights like ular could be better carried out in terms of
those listed in the Declaration of Indepen- fundamental values such as life, health, know-
dence. Humans should be able to exercise ledge and sociability (Hopkins, 2008). But
their right to enhancements to the extent that arguments based on rights and arguments
it promotes their life, liberty, or the pursuit of based on human values tend to emphasize
happiness. common notions of human dignity and the
good life.
However, this at most would make a right to
enhancement a prima facie right because
human rights themselves, though fundamen- 19. Could human enhancement give us
tal, can conflict and are susceptible to modifi- greater or fewer rights?
cation and qualification/ One’s right to liber-
ty, for example, does not automatically per- Future enhancements could either increase or
mit infringement on the rights of others. decrease our rights. Today, this is played out
Rights frequently trump in our considerations in the world of sports where the enhance-
about which action is correct. But rights can ments may come through the use of drugs.
also be trumped by other rights or by ex- Those in charge of a sport must set the rules
tremely harmful consequences. Therefore, to allow or forbid enhancements. In swim-
even if the right to enhancement is regarded ming, some aquadynamic swimsuits are al-
as a derived human right, its application in a lowed and some or not. Now suppose nano-
particular situation could be challenged on devices of the future alter our bodies when
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we are in the water to make us more aquady-
namic. Should such enhanced swimmers be
allowed to compete against unenhanced
swimmers? In situations like this, judgments
about rights that take into account fairness
have to be made. The nanoenhanced swim-
mers could be prohibited from competing at
all or they could be given a new right to com-
pete within a new class of swimmers or, if the
nanoenhancement is easily obtainable by all
competitors, the right to use it could be ex-
tended to everyone. Consider the case of
Oscar Pistorius, the South African sprinter
who had his legs amputated when he was a
year old but now runs on artificial legs (Ed-
wards, 2008a). He missed the qualifying time
for the 2008 Summer Olympics by just three-
quarters of a second. Some argue that his
new legs, which give considerable spring to
his run and do not require blood circulation,
have given him an enhancement that should
not be allowed in races with normal runners.
Others argue that he should not lose the right
to compete with non-disabled runners. The
boundaries of our rights will continue to shift
as further enhancements are developed.
Beyond sports we might imagine what rights 
and duties would be affected if future en-
hancements give some individuals in society
much greater physical and mental abilities
than they have now: Should they have greater
rights or liberties than unenhanced persons?
Would the enhanced then have some duty to
care for the unenhanced, just as the better-
informed and capable parent has a duty to
care for her child? Human enhancement may
create a wide moral chasm between the
haves and have-nots. In such a case, resolving
issues of rights and responsibilities will take
on considerable importance to avoid signifi-
cant social and economic disruptive effects
20.	 Is there an obligation in some circums-
tance to be enhanced?
In some circumstances, there may be an obli-
gation or at least a strong argument to en-
hance. Assuming vaccinations are enhance-
ments, we have an obvious example of a case
in which enhancements are required or at
least strongly recommended. We require
pilots to have training and pass stringent
tests, necessary for the enhancements of a
prospective pilot’s capabilities for everyone’s
safety. Today, prisoners wear ankle bracelets
that transmit information about their loca-
tion. This is a kind of enhancement we allow,
given prisoners have forfeited some of their
rights; moreover, there is a strong argument
for doing this because it relieves overpopula-
tion in prisons while guarding against possible
flight risk by a nonviolent offender.
One area in which we can expect required
enhancements to increase is the military. In
the military, soldiers have fewer rights than
civilians; they lose freedoms and have to obey
reasonable orders. Of course, that is the is-
sue: Is it reasonable for the military to require
enhancement of soldiers beyond their usual
training? One likely possibility is the use of
nanochip “dog tags” that will allow soldiers to
be identified in case of death. Such chips
could also be locators for supervising officers
to track them—how useful on the battlefield
to know where all of your soldiers are and
know the state of their health. Naturally,
weapons and equipment will also be en-
hanced. Today, there are prototypes of de-
vices that make soldiers almost invisible by
projecting the scene behind them in front of
them. But there is no reason to stop there.
Why not implant devices so that soldiers can
be ordered to do what you want either
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through oral and written commands or children however the parents want; that right,
through direct connections to the decision if one exists, seems to be limited by health
and motor operations of their brains? At and safety concerns related to the child.
some point, such enhancements have crossed
the line of which enhancements should be Some have argued at least with regard to
allowed, let alone required. Nevertheless, the education that children possess a further right
need for quick, effective, and decisive actions beyond health and safety. Article 26 of the
by the military will put significant pressure United Nations Universal Declaration of Hu-
toward producing a super soldier. man Rights states that everyone has the right
to education and that education shall be di-
rected to the full development of the human
21. Should children be enhanced? personality and to the strengthening of re-
spect for human rights and fundamental free-
Whether children should be enhanced is a doms. These rights in turn suggest duties for
particularly difficult issue. We give adults parents and for society. If education is a kind
considerable freedom to do what they wish to of social enhancement, this lays the ground-
themselves, as long as it does not harm oth- work for claiming that other kinds of en-
ers. But children are children. Parents must hancements might be the right of children
face the issue of parental rights and responsi- and correlative duties of parents and children.
bilities associated with decisions to enhance Will, for example, children of the future be
children, whether directly (after the child is expected to receive enhancements of their
born) or indirectly through germ-line en- bodies that lead to “the full development of
hancements (to the parent’s transmittable human personality”? Exactly what might be
genes, prior to the child’s birth) (Allhoff, required will depend on the facts of the situa-
2005). This generates quandaries about se- tion, of course. As we have said, context
lecting the proper actions that will only be matters. But what this account shows is that
exacerbated by future enhancement possibili- there is at least a possible line of argument
ties through nanotechnology. On the one that supports not only the right of children to
hand, if parents enhance children with nano- be enhanced but also a duty of their parents
technology, they will be making crucial deci- or society to do it.
sions about the capabilities of their children
that may be irreversible and limit their child- Another difficulty raised with enhancing child-
ren’s future choices and opportunities/ Will ren turns on the therapy-enhancement dis-
the child agree with the choices when he or tinction that we discussed in question 4.
she is older? On the other hand, parents al- Therapy is often required on a child’s behalf,
ready make similar choices in many areas on whereas enhancement may be more volunta-
behalf of their children. Insomuch as parents ry. In the deaf community, an ongoing debate
generally strive to provide the best for their occurs about whether treating deafness is
children—e.g., quality of school/education, a therapy or enhancement. Some in the deaf
proper diet, moral guidance, etc.—will en- community maintain that being deaf is not
hancements overstep any bounds in that ef- something that needs treating. The deaf
fort? Prevailing wisdom suggests that parents community functions with its own language
do not have an unlimited right to raise their and community. This would be undermined if
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deafness were removed. This leads some to
argue that deaf children do not require thera-
py and there is no decisive reason why deaf
children should receive enhancement such as
a cochlear implant. Indeed, real-world cases
exist in which, e.g., deaf parents have been
permitted to deliberately select embryos for
in vitro fertilization that would lead to deaf
babies. Others believe that deafness requires
therapy. On this latter view there is much
more pressure put on parents of a deaf child
to perform their duty of care toward health
and safety and install a cochlear implant for
therapeutic reasons.
Another common concern about enhancing
children lies in the possibility that parents will
enhance their children to give them an edge
in society. Rather than simply buying them
new laptops for school, in the future parents
might buy nanochips for their children’s bo-
dies. The size of our working memory has
much to do with our intelligence. Suppose
some nanochips could be added to instantly
give children a larger working memory; what
an advantage they would have over other
children without them. Of course, it is not
only cognitive enhancement but also the en-
hancement of beauty and functionality of
other parts of the body that might be possi-
ble. Beauty queens and track stars could be
made, improving the outcomes of the genetic
lottery. The likely result of such an enhance-
ment race by parents will strike many as an
unhealthy and unsound approach to develop-
ing the potential children—but how do we
prevent it?
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I. Policy & Law
 
22.	 What are the policy implications of hu-
man enhancement?
Given the preceding discussion, it should be
clear that human enhancement is more than
just about the individual’s freedom or auton-
omy, but there are plausibly negative conse-
quences on others and society that need to
be considered. Or at least an argument needs
to be made that freedom/autonomy trumps
all other values, but such a position seems
unnecessarily dogmatic. These issues point to
the policy dilemma of whether we should
have regulations or restrictions on human
enhancement technologies, so to prevent or
mitigate some of the negative impacts consi-
dered.  Three answers suggest themselves: (1)
no restrictions, (2) some restrictions, or (3) a
moratorium or full ban.
A moratorium seems unrealistic to the extent
that a worldwide one would be needed to
truly stem the use of human enhancement
technologies, and that no worldwide morato-
rium on anything has yet to work, including
on (alleged) attempts to clone a human being.
A local moratorium would send patients to
“back-alley” enhancement clinics or to more
liberal regions of the world, as is the case with
“cosmetic-surgery vacations” in which those
medical procedures are less expensive in oth-
er nations. Further, a ban on enhancement
research seems much too premature—an
overreaction to perceived, future risks—as
well as a real threat to therapy-related re-
search today.
▌ 34
On the other side of the spectrum, the idea of
having no restrictions on human enhance-
ment technologies seems to be reckless or at
least unjustifiably optimistic, given that there
are plausible risks. As pointed out earlier,
complete freedom or autonomy may be a
recipe for disaster and chaos in any case; we
do not want to grant the right to yell “Fire!” in
a crowded venue or the right for dangerous
felons to own firearms.5 
So what about finding middle ground with
some non-Draconian regulations?  Critics have
argued that any regulation would be imper-
fect and likely ineffectual, much like laws
against contraband or prostitution (Naam,
2005); but it is not clear that eliminating these
laws would improve the situation, all things
considered. Also, as a society, we still believe
we ought to at least try to solve social ills,
even if we cannot ultimately fix the entire
problem, e.g., we cannot stop any given crime
from ever occurring again, yet we still have
laws against such acts. And even if there are
practical reasons to not pursue regulations,
would that send the wrong message; e.g., to
children, that we support enhancement with-
out reservations?
The issue of regulation will surely not be set-
tled here, nor do we intend it to. Yet it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the human en-
hancement debate is not just a theoretical
discussion about ethics, but it has bearing on
the real world with policy decisions that may
affect not just the would-be enhanced, but
also researchers, manufacturers, social insti-
tutions, as well as our ideals of freedom and
human dignity (Lin, 2007).
5 Perhaps even the right to be happy may be 
inappropriately exercised, say, at a funeral?
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23.	 Should there be limits on enhancements
allowed, e.g., for military purposes?
At this stage, without knowing exactly what
kinds of human-enhancing devices and treat-
ments will be invented, the answer is unclear.
As we discussed previously, there may be a
compelling case to limit those enhancements
that pose serious health risks to the individual
or profoundly upset social institutions, at least
until we are able to evolve those institu-
tions—such as sports or college admissions— 
to account for an enhancement divide.
Gratuitous enhancements seem to be an easy
case. To the extent that they are not harmful
to the individual, e.g., an ordinary tattoo, and
are not public nuisances, e.g., a profane and
visible tattoo that offends the sensibilities of
others, there does not seem to be a compel-
ling reason to limit them, apart from some
argument that they desecrate the body and
impinge upon human dignity. Un-
enhancements (see question 8 above) pose a
more difficult case study in that we must bal-
ance the interest and expressed will of the
individual against what most persons would
consider to be deliberate and serious harm to
one’s self/
Military applications of human enhancement
technologies presents an even trickier moral
and social dilemma: should we be in the busi-
ness of weaponizing or modifying humans for
someone else’s ends, specifically to inflict
harm on others or otherwise better prosecute
a war (American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science, 2006)? We will also
not fully address such a complicated issue
here, except to note that it involves consider-
ations related to arms proliferation (e.g., does
this encourage other nations to invest in simi-
lar research?), national priorities (e.g., might
▌ 35
research funding be better spent elsewhere,
given that any advantage we gain may be
temporary until our enemies replicate our
technologies, as they historically do?), asym-
metrical warfare (e.g., if enemies are more
easily defeated by our super-soldiers, will
they adapt by taking more desperate meas-
ures, such as more aggressively pursuing nuc-
lear or biochemical weapons?), and other is-
sues familiar to ethics and warfare.
24.	 Might enhanced humans count as some-
one’s intellectual property?
Generally speaking, naturally-occurring ob-
jects (e.g., air, water, other raw materials) 
cannot be patented, and human beings can-
not be legally owned; so whether one could
patent or otherwise claim intellectual proper-
ty (IP) rights over an enhanced human seems
to be a moot question. However, there might
be more to this issue, once we recognize the
related debate on biotechnology patenting,
specifically as it relates to genomics. (Engi-
neered biomedical devices, such as an artifi-
cial heart or knee, would clearly be patent-
eligible under existing US law, though we will
return shortly to the question of whether they
ought to be.)
In the US, the biotechnology-patenting de-
bate starts with the landmark legal decision
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which the Su-
preme Court (by a narrow 5-4 margin) ruled
that a genetically-modified, oil-eating bacte-
rium—which is not naturally occurring—is
patent-eligible (US Supreme Court, 1980).
Since then, the courts have also established
that parts or sequences of genes, though not
the entire gene itself, may be patented if its 
function is also articulated (e.g., US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2009).  Thus, it
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is possible that some sequence of a gene may
be discovered, isolated, and functionalized in
a human-enhancing application, e.g., to slow
or halt aging or give us superhuman strength
or vision. If that happens, then the usual con-
sequences of patent protection would likely
occur, i.e., the cost of such a procedure or
drug would be high, at least for the first 20
years, given a lack of direct competitors.
This particular consequence strikes at the
core of the access concern, as discussed pre-
viously: Whether through genomics, robotics,
or other technologies, the ability to acquire
enhanced abilities will turn on the individual’s
ability to pay. Putting aside the issue of
whether we have a right to enhance ourselves
and how that is impacted by the high cost of
such devices and treatments, it may be rea-
sonably expected that IP law would create an
“enhancement divide” between the enhanced
(those who can afford it) and unenhanced
(those who cannot afford to pay), which is
cause for concern.
Furthermore, again setting rights aside, it will
undoubtedly be argued that some human-
enhancing treatments ought to belong to all
of humanity and not be protected by IP law.
For instance, it would seem immoral to with-
hold or otherwise raise barriers (such as to
charge a price that some are unable to pay) to
receive some therapy that can cure cancer or
aging, just as it is to deny access to basic ma-
terials needed for our survival, e.g., food and
water. Such IP may represent essential disco-
veries needed to move science ahead: for
instance, in nanotechnology, there are al-
ready criticisms that patents are a hindrance
to basic science (Bawa, 2004). As an analogy,
imagine how stunted science would be if the
first microscope had been patented and its
use restricted to only those who could afford
▌ 36
to pay a licensing fee, or how radically differ-
ent our world today would be if merely ac-
cessing the Internet required a similar use-fee
(on top of any service provider fees). Further,
it can be—and has been—claimed that all IP
rights are harmful to innovation and indeed
contradict the basic principles of a free-
market economy, since they are essentially
legalized monopolies (Boldrin and Levine,
2008; Torrance and Tomlinson, 2009). With-
out the protection of patents and copyrights,
companies would be forced to compete on
price, quality, customer service, and so on,
which is a competition that seems to be good
for broader public. Open-source computing is
an example of such a business model.
Of course, the opposing side will rely on the
standard argument that IP rights are a neces-
sary form of incentive for innovation: without
IP protection, companies and individuals
would be much less likely to risk investing
time and research funds to develop products
that can simply be copied by competitors
(Lessig, 2002). We will not engage this larger
debate on whether or not IP law promotes
social goods, except to reiterate that it has a
bearing on the issue of fairness and access to
human enhancement technologies.
25. Will we need to rethink ethics itself?6 
To a large extent, our ethics depends on the
kinds of creatures that we are. Philosophers
traditionally have based ethical theories on
assumptions about human nature. With en-
hancements we may become relevantly dif-
6 This section builds upon previous work: James
H. Moor, “Why We Need Better Ethics for
Emerging Technologies”, Ethics and Information
Technology (2005) 7: 111-119.
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ferent creatures and therefore need to re-
think our basic ethical positions. For example,
will we be as sympathetic toward other hu-
mans that differ substantially from us in their
nature? We may need to do ethics different-
ly. Converging technologies—for example,
nanotechnology, neurotechnology, genetics
and information technology—will almost cer-
tainly enable some dramatic enhancements,
at least in the medium term.
The emergence of these potentially powerful
technologies raises the question of what our
technological future will be like. Will the
quality of our lives improve with increased
technology or not? We at least collectively
can affect our futures by choosing which
technologies to have and which not to have
and by choosing how technologies that we
pursue will be used. The question really is:
How well will we choose? The emergence of
a wide variety of new technologies should
give us a sense of urgency in thinking about
how we approach these technologies and en-
hancements ethically. Which kinds should we
develop and keep? And, how should we util-
ize those that we do keep? It is not satisfac-
tory to do ethics as usual. Better ethical
thinking in terms of being better informed
and better ethical action in terms of being
more proactive are required.
Technologies, particularly new converging
technologies for human enhancement, gener-
ate many ethical problems. Sometimes the
problems can be treated easily under existing
ethical policies. But because new technology
allows us to perform activities in new ways,
situations may arise in which we do not have
adequate policies in place to guide us. We are
confronted with policy vacuums. We need to
formulate and justify new policies (laws, rules,
and customs) for acting in these new kinds of
▌ 37
situations. Sometimes we can anticipate that
the use of the technology will have conse-
quences that are clearly undesirable. As 
much as possible, we need to anticipate these
and establish policies that will minimize the
deleterious effects of the new technology. At
other times the subtleties of the situation
may escape us, at least initially, and we will
find ourselves in a situation of assessing the
matter as consequences unfold. Formulating
and justifying new policies is complicated by
the fact that the concepts that we bring to a
policy-vacuum situation may not provide a
unique understanding of the situation: the
situation may have analogies with different
and competing traditional situations. We find
ourselves in a conceptual muddle about which
way to understand the matter in order to 
formulate and justify a policy.
To avoid such a quandary, first, we need rea-
listically to take into account that ethics is an
ongoing and dynamic enterprise. Second, we
can improve ethics by establishing better col-
laborations among ethicists, scientists, social
scientists, and technologists. We need a mul-
ti-disciplinary approach (Brey, 2000). The
third improvement for ethics would be to de-
velop more sophisticated ethical analyses.
Ethical theories themselves are often simplis-
tic and do not give much guidance to particu-
lar situations. Often the alternative is to do
technological assessment in terms of
cost/benefit analysis. This approach too easi-
ly invites evaluation in terms of money while
ignoring or discounting moral values which
are difficult to represent or translate into
monetary terms. At the very least, we need
to be more proactive and less reactive in
doing ethics (Moor and Weckert, 2004). 
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with human enhancement, especially since
ethics seem to historically lag (far) behind
J. Conclusion technology and other quickly-evolving events.
By planning ahead, we can be better prepared
to enact legislation or regulation as deemed
In the above, we offer a preliminary survey of fit.
many of the major questions in the ethics de-
bate on human enhancement. A full discus- In our discussions, we have striven to follow a
sion is beyond the scope of this investigation disinterested, sensible middle path in present-
and, indeed, could take an entire book to sa- ing the various sides of each issue, given the
tisfactorily answer each question. But our early stage of this debate, though clearly 
brief introduction here is valuable as an entry there are passionate and opposing forces en-
point to the human enhancement ethics con- gaged in this international struggle for clarity 
troversy, which is quickly gaining momentum and policy. An increasing flow of thoughtful
and complexity. literature exists as we write this (e.g., Savu-
lescu and Bostrom, 2009), and we expect the
An impressive array of technologies is driving arguments to continue for many more
the urgency of this debate, from familiar years—proving the prediction that human
drugs (e.g., steroids, modafinil, Ritalin) to fan- enhancement ethics will be the most impor-
tastic visions of a cybernetic future. No one tant debate in science and society is this
knows which visions—utopian, dystopian, or brave new century. Because human en-
pedestrian—ultimately will be realized. But hancement is such a personal matter, for the
insofar as there are good reasons to think that moment, we leave it to our readers to use
many of these visions are plausible, it seems their own moral compass to navigate these
prudent to at least begin a conversation about myriad camps and find their own path to ethi-
the many ethical and social issues associated cal answers. 
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L. NSF Project Summary, 2007-2009
This project is primarily sponsored by the US National Science Foundation, under grant numbers
0620694 (Western Michigan University) and 0621021 (Dartmouth College). Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation (NSF).
As background for this report, the following is a summary of many of the products from our three-
year NSF project, entitled “Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology and Human Enhancement/”  Also, please 
visit http://www.humanenhance.com for our ongoing work in this area.
Opening Workshop
At Dartmouth College on April 14-15, 2007, near the start of our project, we organized a small, public
workshop to guide our work, which included the following presentations. The workshop program
can be found here: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~phil/conferences/nano/index.html
1.	 Ursula Gibson (Dartmouth ollege). “Fundamentals of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology” and
“Nanomedicine and Nanotoxicity”
2.	 Joseph elruno (Dartmouth ollege). “hemistry, Nanoscience and Medicine” and “Nanotech-
nology in the Environment”
3.	 Nancy Woolf (UL!). “Nanotechnological Improvements to Neurons. Exploring the Possibilities”
4.	 George Khushf (Univ/ of South arolina). “Stage 2 Enhancements”
5.	 Ronald Sandler (Northeastern Univ/). “How Not to Think !bout Radical Human Enhancement”
6.	 James Hughes (Trinity ollege). “The Emerging iopolitics of Enhancement”
7.	 Jason Robert (!rizona State Univ/). “Problematizing 'Enhancement'”
8.	 Paul Thompson (Michigan State Univ/). “Human Enhancement's Flipside. Nanotechnology and
the lind hicken”
9.	 Linda MacDonald Glenn (!lden March ioethics Institute). “From uzz Lightyear to Darth Vader:
The Light Side and the Dark Side of onverging Technologies?”
10.	 Wendell Wallach (Yale Univ/). “Nanotechnological Enhancements. Embrace, Reject, or Regu-
late?”
Closing Conference
At Western Michigan University on March 27-29, 2009, toward the end of our project, we organized
a much larger, public conference to share our findings and that of others with the academic commu-
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nity and larger public, which included the following presentations. The conference program can be
found here: www.humanenhance.com/program.pdf
1.	 Rebecca Roache (Oxford). “Ethics, Speculation, and Values”
2.	 Nicole Hassoun (arnegie Mellon). “Nanotechnology, Enhancement, and Human Nature”
3.	 Idil oran (York Univ/). “Foundational Questions about Justice and the Idea of Human Enhance-
ment”
4.	 Ron Sandler (Northeastern Univ/). “Enhancing Justice?”
5.	 Linda MacDonald-Glenn (Albany School of Medicine) and Jeanann S. Boyce (Montgomery Col-
lege). “Not Just a Pretty Face. Legal and Ethical Issues in Regenerative Nanomedicine”
6.	 Daniel Moore (IM). “Human Enhancement & Military”
7.	 Tihamer Toth-Fejel (General Dynamics). “Nanotechnology and Productive Nanosystems for the
U/S/ Military. Progress and Implications”
8.	 olin !llen (Indiana Univ/). “Goggles vs. Implants: Why Cognitive Nanoethics Just Ain't in the
Head”
9.	 Wendell Wallach (Yale). “Public Policy and Human Enhancement. When Should New Technolo-
gies e Embraced and When Should They e Rejected or Regulated?”
10. Sean Hays (Arizona State Univ.): “Nietzsche and the Philosophical Underpinnings of Human En-
hancement”
11.	 arlos Melendez (Michigan State Univ/). “Looking Forward to Enhancement. Ethical Thinking 
efore It’s Too Late”
12.	 Richard Robeson (Univ/ of North arolina, hapel Hill). “Parallax. The lind Spot Created by the
Therapy vs/ Enhancement Dichotomy in Sports Ethics”
13.	 James Hughes (Trinity ollege). “Technoprogressive Policies to Ensure Enhancement Technolo-
gies are Safe and !ccessible”
Books
1.	 Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin, and Daniel Moore, What Is Nanotechnology and Why Does It Matter:
From Science to Ethics, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, in press).
2.	 Fritz Allhoff and Patrick Lin (eds.), Nanotechnology & Society: Current and Emerging Ethical Is­
sues, (Dordrecht: Springer, hardback in April 2008, paperback in October 2008).
3.	 Fritz Allhoff, Patrick Lin, James Moor, and John Weckert, Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Di­
mensions of Nanotechnology (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., hardback and paperback in
2007).
Journal Papers
1.	 Fritz !llhoff, “The oming Era of Nanomedicine”, American Journal of Bioethics 9.10 (2009): In
Press. Featured as Target Article with direct replies by Summer Johnson, Ellen McGee, Ronald
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Sandler, and Tihamer Toth-Fejel. Response issued as. Fritz !llhoff, “Response to ommentators
on ‘The oming Era of Nanomedicine’” (forthcoming)/
2.	 Patrick Lin and Fritz !llhoff, “Untangling the Debate. The Ethics of Human Enhancement”, Na­
noethics: The Ethics of Technologies that Converge at the Nanoscale 2.3 (2008): 251-264.
3.	 Patrick Lin and Fritz !llhoff, “!gainst Unrestricted Human Enhancement”, in James Hughes (ed/),
a special collection in Journal of Evolution and Technology, 18.1 (2008): 35-41.
4.	 James Moor and John Weckert, "Nanotechnology and Nanoethics", Medical Ethics 14.2 (2007):
1-2.
5.	 Fritz Allhoff, "On the Autonomy and Justification of Nanoethics", Nanoethics: The Ethics of Tech­
nologies that Converge at the Nanoscale 1.3 (2007): 185-210.
6.	 Patrick Lin, "Nanotechnology Bound: Evaluating the Case for More Regulation", NanoEthics: Eth­
ics for Technologies that Converge at the Nanoscale 1.2 (2007): 105-122.
Other Publications
1.	 Patrick Lin, “Therapy and Enhancement. Is There a Moral Difference?”, Genetic Engineering & 
Biotechnology News, July 2009, vol. 29, issue 13: 6-7.
2.	 Patrick Lin, Keith !bney, and George ekey, “!utonomous Military Robots. Risk, Ethics, and De-
sign,” report commissioned by US Department of Navy/Office of Naval Research (2008)/
3.	 Fritz !llhoff and Patrick Lin (eds/), “Nanotechnology and Human Enhancement,” a journal sym-
posium in NanoEthics: Ethics for Technologies that Converge at the Nanoscale 2.3 (2008): 251-
327.
Presentations:
In addition to publications described here, we have been disseminating and will continue to dissemi-
nate our research online as well as through media interviews and other forums. Toward this goal,
our related lectures, conference presentations, and media work include the following:
1.	 Patrick Lin, “Philosophy and Technology—ase Study. The Ethics of Human Enhancement”, ali-
fornia Polytechnic State Univ. at San Luis Obispo, 29 May 2009.
2.	 Patrick Lin, “Nanoethics”, alifornia Polytechnic State Univ/ at San Luis Obispo, 12 March 2009/
3.	 Patrick Lin, “War Robots. What are the Risks and Ethical Issues?”, !ssociation for Practical and
Professional Ethics (APPE) 2009 conference, 7 March 2009.
4.	 Patrick Lin, “Ethics and Military Robots”, alifornia Polytechnic State Univ/ at San Luis Obispo, 25 
Feb 2009.
5.	 Patrick Lin, “Nanotechnology and the Environment”, Univ/ of Delaware/Delaware iotechnology 
Institute, Environmental Nanoparticles: Science, Ethics, and Policy conference, 11 Nov 2008.
6.	 Fritz !llhoff, “Risk & Precaution”, Univ. of Delaware/Delaware Biotechnology Institute, Environ-
mental Nanoparticles: Science, Ethics, and Policy conference, 11 Nov 2008.
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7.	 Patrick Lin, “Nanotechnology & Philosophy”, alifornia Polytechnic State Univ/, San Luis Obispo,
CA, 29 May 2008.
8.	 Patrick Lin, “Nanotechnology's Promises and hallenges”, The Discovery Institute for the !d-
vancement of Science and Technology Education's STEM Showcase, San Luis Obispo, CA, 10 May 
2008.
9.	 James Moor, “Nanoethics”, University of Massachusetts, !mherst M!, 15 !pril 2008/
10.	 James Moor, “The Problem of Nanoethics”, US !rmy Natick Soldier Research, Development and
Engineering Center, Natick, MA, 28 Feb 2008.
11.	 James Moor, “Is Nanoethics !nything in Particular”, !nnual Meeting of Practical and Professional
Ethics (APPE), San Antonio, TX, 23 Feb 2008.
12.	 Fritz !llhoff, “Issues in Nanoethics”, Nanotechnology Law & ommerce.  usiness at One-
Billionth of a Meter, New York, NY, 31 Jan 2008.
13.	 Patrick Lin, “Superman vs/ Frankenstein’s Monster: The Debate on Human Enhancement Tech-
nologies”, International ongress of Nanotechnology, San Francisco, !, 6 Nov 2007/
14.	 Patrick Lin, “The Rise of Nanoethics. Emerging Issues in Nanotechnology and Society”, Yale Uni-
versity, CT, Interdisciplinary Center for Bioethics, 10 Oct 2007.
15. James Moor, “What is Nanoethics?”, Rivier ollege Lecture Series, Rivier ollege, NH, 9 Oct 2007/
16.	 Fritz !llhoff, “Nanotechnology and Nanoethics”, The Governance of Science and Technology, The
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia, 9 Aug 2007.
17.	 Fritz !llhoff, “Nanotechnology and Nanoethics”, !ustralasian !ssociation of Philosophy 2007, 
University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia, 3 July 2007.
18. James Moor, Lectures on Nanoethics for the NSF Research Experience for Undergraduates Sum-
mer Program at Dartmouth College in connection with The Center for Nanomaterials Research at
Dartmouth, NH, 21 June, 27 June, and 5 July 2007.
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M. Contacts
Please visit http://www.humanenhance.com for our ongoing work in this area. 
1. Fritz Allhoff, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor & Director of Graduate Studies
Western Michigan University
Department of Philosophy
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008
Email: fritz.allhoff@wmich.edu
Department phone: 269.387.4503
2. Patrick Lin, Ph.D.
Director, Ethics & Emerging Sciences Group
California Polytechnic State University
Department of Philosophy
San Luis Obispo, California 93407
Email: palin@calpoly.edu
Department phone: 805.756.2041
3. James Moor, Ph.D. 
Daniel P. Stone Professor in Intellectual and Moral Philosophy
Dartmouth College
Thornton Hall 6035
Hanover, NH 03755
Email: moor@dartmouth.edu
Department phone: 603.646.2155
4. John Weckert, Ph.D.
Professorial Fellow
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics
LPO Box 8260
Canberra ACT 2601 Australia
Email: jweckert@csu.edu.au
Department phone: 61.2.6129.8995
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